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At a Special Term of the Sullivan County
Supreme Court, held in and for the County
of Sullivan, in the V~e..QfMonticello,
New York, on the J day
017

J$1f

PRESENT: HON. STEPHAN SCHICK
JUSTICE
STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF SULLIVAN

In the Matter of the Application of
ROBERT SETH HAYES,# 74-A-2280
Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the
Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND ORDER
INDEX NO. 200-2017

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
TINA STANFORD, CHAIRPERSON
Respondent.

APPEARANCES:

EV A ROSAHN, ESQ.
277 Broadway, Suite 1501
New York, New York I 0007
Attorney for Petitioner
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDER MAN
Attorney General for the State of New York
(Jeane L. Strickland Smith, Esq., AAG of Counsel)
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 40 I
Poughkeepsie, New York 12224
Attorneys for the Respondent

SCHICK, J ..
Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging respondenfs
determination which denied his application for parole release and held him for an additional 24
month period.
Petitioner is in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Services (DOCCS) serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment. Petitioner was convicted of
crimes committed in three separate incidences. In 1974, he was found guilty of Murder in the death
of a transit authority police officer. The petitioner was also convicted of the crimes of Possession of
a Weapon, Robbery in the First Degree and Grand Larceny in the Third Degree for stealing a vehicle
at gunpoint from another victim. In June, 1974 the petitioner was sentenced to a term of 25 years to
life on the murder conviction and concurrent lesser terms on the remaining convictions. In July 1974,

the petitioner was involved in an incident whereby he shot and wounded four police officers.
Petitioner was found guilty of four counts of Attempted Murder and was sentenced to a term of25
years to life on each count. In 1975, the petitioner pied guilty to the crime of Possession of a Weapon
for firing a gun at two police officers on patrol.
The petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for his tenth parole hearing on June 14,
2016. After the interview, the Board issued its decision denying petitioner's release and ordered
petitioner held for 24 months. The Panel concluded that:
After carefully reviewing your record, a personal interview, and due
deliberation of this Panel concludes that discretionary release is not
presently warranted as your release would be incompatible with the
welfare of society. You stand convicted of the serious offenses of Att.
Murder (5 counts), Murder, Criminal Possession of a Weapon and
Grand Larceny.
Your criminal history indicates that these crimes of conduct throughout
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1973 in which you targeted police, was your first contact with the
law. The Panel takes note of all statutory factors including your
rehabilitative efforts and programming, risk and needs assessment,
case plan, re-entry plans, letters of support, community opposition,
sentencing minutes and your disciplinary record. You have not had a
disciplinary since 1999.
The Panel reviewed your present and past parole packets and even
the psychological risk assessment submitted previously by Joel
Schoir,' PhD, on your behalf.
The Panel p.otes that the community opposition to your release is extremely
forceful, strong, recent and consistent. You targeted police. Police
officers are the last line of defense in a civil society.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal-with the Division of Parole Appeals Unit on September
l, 2016. On or about October 11, 2016, the appeal was denied by the respondent. Petitioner now
brings this CPLR Article 78 proceeding.
Initially, the petitioner alleges the Board failed to comply with Executive Law§ 259-c(4)
which requires the Board to use procedures to measure an inmate's rehabilitation and the likelihood
of success upon release. The petitioner maintains his parole denial should be vacated.
In 2011, Executive Law§ 259-c(4) was amended to require the Board to "establish written
procedures for its use in making parole decisions" and to consider the person's likelihood of success
upon release to parole supervision. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c) was amended to consolidate into
one section the complete list of factors the Board is required to consider in evaluating applications
for parole release. The amendments to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c) became effective in
administrative hearings conducted on or after October 1, 2011.
Petitioner's parole release interview was subject to the requirements of Executive Law §
259-c(4). The petitioner alleges the decision of the Board was irrational and did not consider alJ of
the requirements of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c). (Matter of Thwaites v. NYS Board of Parole, 34
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Misc3d 694 [Sup. Ct. 2011]).
A review of the record indicates the Board considered the requirements of the Executive Law
relating to parole release. The amendments to Executive Law 259-i(2)(c) did not result in a
substantiative change in the criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its
decisions. (Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197 [3rd Dept. 2014]).). This Court finds the factors that
must be considered for release e>n parole were adequately considered here. The record does not
demonstrate that the Parole Board failed to consider the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law
§ 259-i(2)(c). (Goldberg v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 103 AD3d 634 [2°d Dept. 2013)].
As stated in Executive Law §259-i (2) (c)(A):
"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient
performance of duties while confined but after considering ifthere is a re~onable probability that,
if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of
his crime as to undermine respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require
that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments,
therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a
participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any
deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate; (v) any statement made to the
board by the crime victim or the victim's representative ... "

Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory requirements,
will not be disturbed. (Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320 [3d Dept. 2015]). If the Parole
Board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, the Board's determination
is not subject to judicial review. (Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d
1268 [3rd Dept. 2014]). Furthermore, only a "showing ofinationality bordering on impropriety" on
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the part of Uie Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention. (Matter of Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 4 70 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d
69 [ 1980]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary
determination made by the Parole Board. (Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 AD3d 1413 [41h Dept. 2014]).
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the merits of petitioner's case.
Petitioner argues the decision to deny him parole was irrational, arbitrary and capricious, and
resulted in a gross abuse of discretion. A Board's determination denying parole release will not be
disturbed unless there is a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of Silmon v.
Travis, 95 NY2d at 476). The Court finds the Parole Board considered the relevant factors in
making its decision and its determination was supported by the record. The decision was sufficient
to apprise petitioner of the reasons for the denial of discretionary release. A review of the transcript
of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offenses, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner's institutional programming and his plans upon release. He was given an
opportunity to make a statement in support of his release. The Board also had petitioner's sentencing
minutes, Inmate Status Report, Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, a COMPAS Reentry Risk
Assessment and a COMPAS Case Plan which details petitioner's institutional adjustment,
programming, disciplinary record, proposed release plans, criminal history, risk factors and the facts
of the current offense. Petitioner claims his COMPAS risks levels were low. Contrary to petitioner's
claim, the COMPAS assessment is but one of many documents the Board now considers when
making its parole release decisions. (Matter of Thomas v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1069 prd Dept. 2013]).
While the Board must consider the conclusion reached through use of the COMPAS assessment, it
may draw a different conclusion regarding the risks posed by the petitioner's release. (Matter of
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Rtvera v. New 'York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 [3'd Dept 2014]).
The Court notes the Board was free to place emphasis on the seriousness of petitioner's
instant offenses. (Matter of Montalvo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 AD3d 1438 [3d Dept.
2008]). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one. (Matter of
Vigliotti v. State of New York Executive Div. of Parole, 98 AD3d 789 [3rd Dept. 2012];
(Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3d Dept. 2008]). The
determination is not rendered improper by the Parole Board's failure to "expressly discuss each of
these guidelines in its determination" (Matter of Kin~ v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d
788 [ 1994]). In addition, Executive Law§ 259-i(2) does not grant parole release merely as a reward
for petitioner's good conduct or achievements while incarcerated. (Matter of Mentor v. New York
State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245 [3rc1 Dept. 2011]). The Court finds it was not irrational for
the Board to place more weight on instant offenses than petitioner's institutional accomplishments
and plans for release. (Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division ofParole, 119 AD3d at 12731274). Petitioner has failed to meet his burden showing the Board did not consider the relevant
statutory factors or that the decision was irrational, arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Petitioners conclusionary allegation that the Board's decision was predisposed to denying
him release is without merit. (Matter of Connelly v. New York State Division of Parole, 286 AD2d
792 [3n1 Dept. 2001], appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 677 [2001]). In addition, petitioner's allegations
of bias on the part of the Board are not supported by the record and petitioner failed to offer proof
that the outcome of this case flowed from the alleged bias. (Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271
AD2d 777 [3rd Dept. 2000], Iv denied 95 NY2d 769 [2001]). The Parole Board is required to
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consider the same factors each time the petitioner appears for a parole 1elease hewing. (Mattei of
Williams v. New York State Division of Parole, 70 AD3d 1106 [3rd Dept. 201 O[, lv denied 17 NY3d
709 [2010]). The record discloses the Board rendered its determination after considering the full
record, including the hearing testimony, the petitioner's institutional background, his achievements,
his criminal history and release plans. (Matter of Marziak v. Alexander, 62 AD3d 1227 [3rd Dept.
2009]; Matter of Salahuddin v. Dennison, 34 AD3d 1082 [3rd Dept. 2006]).
Petitioner's claim that he was denied due process has been examined and found to be without
merit. Executive Law § 259-i, does not create an entitlement to release on parole and therefore does
not create interests entitled to due process. (Paunetto v. Hammock, 516 F. Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct.,
SDNY, 1981 ]). There is no due process right to parole. (Russo v. New York State Board of Parole,
50 NY2d at 73). Also, there is no due process right to an inmate obtaining a statement as to what he
should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. (Matter of Francis v. New York State
Division of Parole. 89 AD3d 1312 [3rd Dept. 2005]). Nor does the denial of parole constitute double
jeopardy. (Matter of Patterson v. Goord, 1AD3d845 [3rd Dept. 2003]). Petitioner's allegation that
the denial of parole was akin to re-sentencing is without merit. (Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 AD3d
1320 [3rd Dept. 2011]).
Petitioner maintains the Board should not have considered community opposition to his
parole release. Petitioner claims as a "result of the solicitation of emails by the N. Y.C. Police
Benevolent Association (PBA) in furtherance of their explicit position that no one convicted of
homicide of a police officer should ever be released from prison, no matter the sentencing judge's
recommendations or the parole applicants's particular facts." Petitioner contends Executive Law
259-i does not allow the Board to consider opposition statements from the public. Petitioner claims
7

the statements from the publlc may contain erroneous informabon tliat should not have been
considered by the Board.
Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) provides a crime victim or his/her closest surviving
relative an opportunity to present a statement to the Parole Board containing information relevant
to the inmate and the crime victim. Executive Law§ 259-i [2][c][B] provides "where a crime victim
or victim's representative ... or other person submits to the parole board a written statement
concerning the release of an inmate, the parole board shall keep that individual's name and address
confidential." Executive Law§ 259-i does not restrict the opportunity of the public from submitting
a statement or comment in regard to an inmate's parole release request as the statute refers to "other
person". The Board may Consider statements from "other persons" in addition ~o a victim or his/her
family.
This Court is mindful of the holding in Matter of Comfort v. New York State Board of
Parole, I 01AD3d1450 [3rd Dept. 2012]). In Comfort. the Court reversed the denial of parole release
finding the Board relied upon significant letters in opposition to petitioner's release that contained
an erroneous characterization of petitioner's conviction and "it was error for the Board to credit those
tainted letters." The petitioner in this proceeding has not alleged or demonstrated that the Board
considered any erroneous letters or emails from the public that influenced their decision in denying
parole release. Petitioner's allegation that the Board may have considered erroneous information
supplied by public opposition is merely speculative. It would not be unusual for the NYC PBA to
oppose parole release of thos<? inmates who have been convicted of the murder of a police officer.
The allegation that the Board considered erroneous information provided by community opposition
is unfounded. The petitioner was denied parole release for reasons other than community opposition.
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(Matter of Ebbs, 54 AD2d 611 [41t1 Dept. 1976], appeal deruea 40 NV2d 897 (1976]). The Parole
Board denied parole release pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i based upon the many factors
discussed herein.
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds them

to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was in accordance with the statutory
requirements and was not excessive, irrational, arbitrary, capricious or in violation of lawful
procedure. (Matter of Russo v. NYS Board of Parole, 50 NY2d at 77). The Petition is therefore
dismissed.
This shall constitute the Decision, Order and Judgment of the Court. This Decision,
Order and Judgment is being returned to the attorneys for respondent. All original supporting
documentation is being filed with the Sullivan County Clerk's Office. The signing of this
Decision, Order and Judgment shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel are
not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule relating to filing, entry, and notice of
entry.

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
ENTER.

ffACJ.f
Dated:
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,2017
Monticello, New York

Supreme Court Justice
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Pipers Considered:

1.

Notice of Petition undated; Verified Petition dated February 1, 2017 with annexed
exhibits A-D;

2.

Verified Answer and Return dated March 7, 2017 with annexed exhibits 1-12;

3.

Affinnation of Eve Rosahn, Esq. dated March 16, 2017.
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